Wednesday, July 16, 2008

Fair Value, Insolvency and Stock Prices


Is anyone else somewhat baffled by the latest concern about the solvency of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae and the resulting impact to its stock price? Where was all this concern back in the highs of the dot-com bubble? Those companies were most certainly insolvent - besides the cash infusions they were getting, they had zero revenues and their assets consisted, for the most part, of instantly obsolete computer hardware. So, then, why is it then that Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's solvency is now such headline-making news and, apparently, the basis for its volatile stock price?

It ultimately must come down to future expectations. Dot-com stock prices rose because the expected earnings of those companies continued to rise - regardless of whether those expectations are well founded. Consequently, then, it would seem as though the markets are now implying that neither Fannie or Freddie would be able to meet its debt obligations with the lower future expected revenues on the depreciating assets that it still holds. Of course, when you add-in the guarantee of the government, this adds a whole new dynamic to the mix. With that guarantee, the earnings of these two institutions become almost secondary as the government could always, then, step-in to satisfy any claims when they arose. The question remains, however, why the question over its solvency continues to be such a significant question mark.

Could it be that the markets have learned their lessons from the dot-com era and are now looking at the balance sheets of the companies in which they invest ...before they invest? It's possible, to some extent, but I think that it's actually more likely that this is just another example of the markets grabbing onto any kind of headline-making news to justify trades in either direction. Speculators, making profits on their short sales and derivative positions love volatility and Freddie and Fannie have been their best friends lately. A savvy investors should, on the other hand, question the headlines as to what actual news they reveal. Nothing had changed since the week prior to these solvency headlines to today; the only revelation was that the financial journalists decided that it was now news. Was it because they didn't have anything else to write about? Maybe more simply, questioning a company's solvency sells papers and sells TV ads. As an investor, of course, you need to question the value of that information.

Common Sense that's not so Common


If there is a silver lining to the current state of the financial markets it's that many of the events of the past few months will serve to fill a whole new generation of economic and financial textbooks - education future analysts and managers on what not to do. Last week, IndyMac became the second largest financial institution to be seized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) after a run on the bank left it short on cash. Having seen its stock price fall from a peak of $50.11 in mid 2006 to a closing price of $0.28 on July 11, it certainly looked as though the markets could see what was coming, so why didn't the bank's managers?

IndyMac was, not surprisingly, [too] heavily involved in the so-called Alt-A mortgages and, of those mortgages, [too] heavily concentrated in California - the second worst hit real estate market in the U.S. Many now suggest that IndyMac could have avoided its collapse by altering its business practices when it began to see a peak in the real estate markets; of course, hindsight is 20-20 and we all seem wiser after the fact. That said, one of the first things that anyone learns when studying finance is diversification; how can the leaders of financial institutions like Bears Stearn and now IndyMac be so complacent in their responsibilities to diversify their businesses? 

Even if you don't know anything about investing, you've probably heard the saying 'not to put all your eggs in one basket'. I personally don't believe that IndyMac could have fairly spotted a market peak and adjusted its business accordingly. I do believe that the use of not-so-common common sense could have very well avoided its collapse. Every market goes through cycles and investing too heavily in just one such market exposes you to those cycles. Diversification is your safety net by compensating you for losses in one market with gains in another; it's so simple. Personally, the management of firms who don't exercise this common principle should be punished in some way - it should not be the federal government (and tax payers, by corollary) who should be held responsible in such circumstances.

What a roller coaster for Fannie and Freddie


Well, if you haven't heard about the roller coaster ride taken by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the markets this week, then try this on for size. How about loosing 50% in its market cap in a matter of hours and then recovering to a loss of about 5% by the end of the same trading day. Then, of course, you must has what triggered all that volatility. The answer, unfortunately, doesn't exactly inspire a lot of confidence in the financial markets.

It comes down to your definition and interpretation of the government's guarantee of both Fannie and Freddie and, more simply, rumours and speculation. Rumours, probably more than anything, caused the massive swings. Rumours about both the institutions' abilities to raise capital as well as about what the government would do, exactly, to help protect investors. Secondly, there is now even more speculation about what any government support would mean for the U.S. government as a whole and how that could even more broadly affect America's financial markets and the continuing credit crisis.

With the Fed's credit window now opened to both Freddie and Fannie, many of the concerns have been calmed. As I write this post, actually, Freddie and Fannie are reallying - up almost double digits today. Nothing has changed, of course, from yesterday so your guess as to the cause of this rally is as good as anyone else's. That's the real problem; there's so much uncertainty that investors, and the markets as a whole, are too eager to grab on to any positive news and trade the hell out of it. If you've ever studied finance, then you'll remember reading about the efficiency of markets; the activity in Freddie and Fannie over the past month will no doubt go down in textbook history as an example of how inefficient the markets can be. 

Thursday, July 10, 2008

Freddie, Fannie and Implicit Federal Guarantees


Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have, between them, the worst of jobs in this particular market: making the mortgage loans that every other bank is running away from ...fast. Between these two companies, they guarantee about $12 trillion in loans. Yes, that's a 't'. What's curious about the current situation, however, is that although these two companies have the implicit guarantee of the federal government, the open market seems to have placed some question on whether that federal government would actually step-up when the time comes... as it may very well come.

Today, there's even a question of the companies' solvency. Solvency, as you know, represents a company's ability to repay all its creditors after liquidating all its assets. Consequently, there seems to be some question as to whether the assets of Freddie and Fannie actually outweigh the massive debts it now holds. Of course, with a guarantee from the Federal government, there would be no worry as the government could always, theoretically, print money to pay every one back. With the staggering sums at stake, however, some are questioning whether they will do so. How do we know that they're questioning this? Simple. Look at the premium that Freddie Mac just paid on its latest $3 billion debt issue - almost 3-quarters of a percent over the U.S. Treasury rate. That premium is a risk premium, of course.

One could, of course, take the opposite position on this and reap the rewards should the market have overreacted. The consequences of allowing Freddie and Fannie fail would overwhelm anything that could have happened from the failure of an investment bank such as Bears Strean, which the Fed has obviously stated could not fail. Similarly, then, Freddie and Fannie cannot fail. As such, the markets certainly appear to have seriously overreacted on their risk asssessment of these two companies. An investor prepared to take this leap of faith, however, could benefit from a staggering medium-term return should the Fed make its implicit guarantee explicit. So, where do you stand?

Wednesday, July 9, 2008

Alma Mater Networking Value


I just read an interesting article over at Bloomberg that discusses the value of our alma maters as a source of connections (i.e. networking). Not surprisingly, of course, the article starts-out by discussing the premium value placed on the Ivy League schools like Harvard and Wharton whose names are tossed-around Wall Street on a daily basis. There's no doubt that graduates of these schools have wealth of networking possibilities due, simply, to the immense size of the alumni populations from such schools. What's really interesting, however, is what the author found about schools in general - ivy league or otherwise.

Simply, we're happy to help those who share something in common with us. It speaks to human tendencies in general, I suppose. Birds of a feather, right? Well, those of us who graduated from schools with less well-known alumni networks may be happy to hear that the bonds between alumni may be even stronger for the very simple reason that there are fewer people out there to take advantage of those networks. It makes a lot of sense, when you think about it.

Harvard, for example, has such an enormous alumni network that there is no doubt that thousands are looking to benefit from that network on a daily basis. Conversely, graduates of smaller schools may encounter a fellow alumni rarely; consequently, these rare encounters are all the more special and may thus result in that much more value to each member looking to benefit from these networks in some way. Hurray!

Fannie Mae's Debt Issue & Credit Yield Spreads


Amid speculation that Fannie Mae doesn't have enough capital to weather the continuing credit crisis, it has gone ahead and issued $3 billion in new debt. What's interesting about this, however, is the yield (cost) at which it was issued. The new debt will yield 3.25% - a full 74 basis points above the equivalent U.S. Treasuries. Given that Fannie Mae, theoretically, has the backing of the U.S. government and, consequently, should benefit from essentially risk-free cost of capital, this suggests the investing community feels otherwise about its credit worthiness.

With all the talk about the ratings agencies and the validity of those ratings, I suppose it's not all that surprising to see investors making their own determinations about the credit risk associated with a particular issue. Moreover, when you think about it, shouldn't the market as a whole be better qualified to determine the risk associated with a particular security than a single ratings agency?

The capital markets serve as a pricing mechanism. The collective buying and selling of millions of investors every day works to determine the value that we, on average, associate to a particular security. Why, then, should we not use the power of the same distributed intelligence to ascertain the credit risk associated with a debt issue? To be fair, the markets already do this - using the ratings agencies as a sort of starting-point for their evaluation. My question, I suppose, is whether or not we actually need that starting-point.

Tuesday, July 8, 2008

Emerging Economies May Not Save Us

As the US economy, as well as the Canadian and much of the European economies, sinks deeper into recession, many are pointing (maybe partly with great hope) that the emerging markets will bail-out the rest of the world by driving overall demand. Unfortunately, that doesn't seem to be the case with emerging markets not only showing signs of weakness, but showing signs of even more drastic declines than what the developed economies are currently experiencing.

This graph is sourced from Charles Schwab's latest webcast and presents a diffusion index of developed (lower chart) and emerging (upper chart) economic forces. Essentially, a downward sloping line is a bad thing and an upward sloping line is a good thing. What I find most interesting about these charts is the leader-follower dynamic that appears to be taking place. While most analysts and market watchers have been pointing to China and India as possible saviors of the global economy with their fabulous growth rates, it now looks as though the declines in demand from the developed economies is beginning to take its tole on their markets. Moreover, it would appears as though the declines that they are now experiencing are more severe than what the developed economies have seen. 

Inflation appears to be the culprit here. While we've seen low single-digit rates, the developing markets (the blue, in the left-hand chart) are showing near-double-digit rates. More importantly, their pace of inflationary growth (the slope of the line) is noticeably more steep. This is primarily due to wage-pressures. While the US and other developed markets have not seen wages rise, this has not been the case in the developing economies. The rest of the world is facing much greater inflationary pressures than we are at home and this spells great trouble for them in the future. 

So what does this all mean for us at home? Well, put simply, we can't rely on any other economy to help bail us out. We are in a global economy, to be sure, but that economy is by no means uniform. The rest of the world, especially the developing parts of that world, are only beginning to enter their own recessions and everything points to their troubles being worse than anything we will see domestically. On the whole, of course, this suggests a very slow and long recovery. While the developed markets may be better prepared to recover sooner, we are no dependent on emerging markets just as they are dependent on developed markets. As they are likely to sink deeper than we are, their economic pains will most certainly ripple through the rest of the world.